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SOME CONSTITUTIONAL ANGLES OF THE
"NEW DEAL"
By SIDNEY S. JACOBS, of the Denver Bar
HE executive and legislative departments of the United
States government have cooperated to create some of the
most unusual legislation and governmental machinery
that has ever existed in the history of the United States.
That the "New Deal" is both popular and unpopular with
certain portions of the public is a matter of every day knowl-
edge. What the judicial department of the government will
find concerning the constitutionality of the new legislation,
however, is a matter of great conjecture and anxiety at this
time. It is the intention of the author to present some of the
constitutional problems which may arise concerning the con-
stitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act and
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the two principal statutes
of the "New Deal."
Before commencing a discussion of the legality of said
acts it may be well to explain briefly what each of these acts
proposes to do. The N. I. R. A. is an attempt to bring back
prosperity by increasing the purchasing power of consumers.
It proposes to increase this purchasing power by creating
codes of fair competition which fix prices, control output,
raise wages, shorten hours of labor, and abolish or limit child
labor. The A. A. A. is an experiment intended to raise the in-
come of farmers. It proposes to do this by limiting the
amount of crops planted so that production may be controlled
and higher prices obtained. Farmers who cooperate with the
government by reducing crops planted are to remunerated
from process taxes placed upon manufactured articles.
In dealing with the constitutionality of the acts in
question a distinction should be made between codes that are
signed voluntarily and those which are imposed upon em-
ployers, industries and farmers against their will. The for-
mer class probably are valid inasmuch as they are contracts
voluntarily entered into for the benefit of third party bene-
ficiaries also; because the contracting parties hope indirectly
to benefit themselves. An interesting decision on this point
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was recently banded down in the Denver District Court by
Judge Frank McDonough, Sr., who allowed employes to
recover from their employer minimum wages set by a code
which had been voluntarily signed by a restaurant owner.
There is the possibility, however, that some code agreements
which are signed voluntarily may be held unconstitutional if
the signing was caused by duress. Where codes are arbitrarily
imposed, however, a different problem arises. Codes of the
latter type will be considered hereafter in this article.
It must be remembered that the United States govern-
ment is a government of restricted powers; that only certain
designated powers are given to it, and that under the tenth
amendment to the constitution, "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people." Therefore, if the aforementioned acts are to be
found constitutional, some specific authority of congress to
pass them must be found.
Section I of the N. I. R. A. declares that "a disorganiza-
tion of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign com-
merce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the stand-
ards of living of the American people," exists in this country.
It may be concluded from the above declaration that the con-
stitutionality of the act is based upon the power of congress
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, or to provide for
the public welfare. The latter ground will be considered
first.
It has been repeatedly held that the "general welfare
clause" is merely incidental to the power of congress to tax,
and that said clause does not confer any new power upon con-
gress.1 The clause in question is Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, which reads as follows: "The congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and ex-
cises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, im-
posts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." In view of the above, it is practically certain that




the constitutionality of the acts in question cannot be sus-
tained under the "general welfare" clause.
A more difficult question is presented, however, as to
whether or not the acts in question are a valid regulation of
interstate and foreign commerce. The general rule seems to
be that it is unconstitutional for congress to attempt to regu-
late prices,2 hours of employment, child labor,' and wages in
the industries under the guise of regulating interstate com-
merce.4  The most famous decision on this point was made
in The Child Labor Case, Hammer vs. Dagenhart.5  In that
case an act of congress was held unconstitutional which in-
tended to prevent interstate commerce in the products of child
labor. The court stated:
"In our view the necessary effect of this act is, by means of a
prohibition against the movement in interstate commerce of ordinary
commercial commodities, to regulate the hours of labor of children in
factories and mines within the states, a purely state authority. Thus
the act in a twofold sense is repugnant to the Constitution. It not only
transcends the authority delegated to congress over commerce but also
exerts a power to a purely local matter to which the federal authority
does not extend."
Furthermore, the imposition of codes prescribing mini-
mum wages probably constitute a deprivation of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, contrary to the pro-
visions of Amendment 5 of the Constitution, for it has been
held that liberty includes the right to make contracts of em-
ployment upon such terms as the employer and employe think
proper.6
Proponents of the constitutionality of the N. R. A. and
the A. A. A. claim that though the acts would probably be un-
constitutional in normal times, that because they are predi-
cated upon an emergency, and because they are expressly lim-
ited to two years, they are constitutional under the police
power of the government." In support of this position the
'47 Supreme Court Reporter 426.
'259 U. S. 20 and 247 U. S. 251.
"Nation, October 18, 1933.
5247 U. S. 251.
'262 U. S. 522, 208 U. S. 161, 236 U. S. 1.
'Temple Law Quarterly. Vol. VIII, No. 1, page 3.
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cases of Wilson vs. New,' Block vs. Hirsh,' Marcus Brown
Holding Co. vs. Feldman,'0 and Wolff Packing Cases1 are
cited.
Wilson vs. New held constitutional an act of congress
which for 30 days only set minimum wages and maximum
hours for employes of trains engaged in interstate commerce.
The act was designed to prevent a strike which would have
stifled interstate commerce, and is quite different from an at-
tempt to regulate intrastate conditions of employment in fac-
tories, stores, etc. The Wolff Packing Cases cannot be con-
sidered authority for the acts of the "New Deal," because
there the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations Act, which
gave an administrative board the authority to fix the terms
of contracts of employment, was held unconstitutional. Any
statements in favor of the constitutionality of such acts as are
considered here are only obiter dicta.
Block vs. Hirsh and Marcus Brown Holding Co. vs.
Feldman were decided together, involve the same facts, and
are known as "The Rent Cases." The former case involved
an act of congress for the District of Columbia, and the latter
case a statute of New York. During the world war so many
people flocked to Washington, D. C., and New York City
on official business that it became almost impossible for gov-
ernment officials to rent a house in those cities at a reasonable
rent. Consequently, statutes were passed which allowed ten-
ants to continue in possession of premises after the end of the
term, and against the Will of the landlord, provided the ten-
ants paid rents which a commission determined were reason-
able. The statutes were to be in effect for only two years.
The statutes in each of these cases were held constitutional.
In the decision of the court it was stated, "A limit in time,
to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that
could not be upheld as a permanent change." The court
based authority for the act in the police power of the govern-
ment, and states, "The only matter that seems to us open to
debate is whether the statute goes too far. For just as there
'243 U. S. 332.
'256 U. S. 135.
1"256 U. S. 170.
u262 U. S. 522.
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comes a point at which the police power ceases and leaves only
that of eminent domain, it may be conceded that regulations
of the present sort pressed to a certain height might amount
to a taking without due process of law."
Whether the police power provides sufficient constitu-
tional authority for acts such as the N. I. R. A. and the
A. A. A. is indeed a border line question, and one which the
writer will not be so vain as to attempt to answer. The acts
in the "Rent Cases" and the acts of the "New Deal" both are
limited to two years. Both recite that they are based upon an
emergency. In the Rent Cases the emergency was a war.
Whether a depression can be considered such an emergency as
would justify the government in doing things normally un-
constitutional is yet to be decided. Then, too, the N. I. R. A.
and the A. A. A. attempt to regulate many more things than
simply the regulation of rent, and in the decision of the
"Rent Cases" Justice Holmes recognizes that there is a point
at which the police power ceases, and that the going beyond
that point would be taking property without due process of
law. In a more recent decision, 12 Justice Holmes discusses the
"Rent Cases" in the following language: "The late decisions
upon laws dealing with the congestion of, Washington and
New York, caused by the war, dealt with laws intended to
meet a temporary emergency and providing for compensation
determined to be reasonable by an impartial board. They
went to the verge of the law but fell far short of the present
act."
Those who, in view of past decisions, believe that the
N. I. R. A. and the A. A. A. are unconstitutional claim that
the acts attempt to make permanent economic changes rather
than temporary changes and that the "emergency" will not
abate but will continue. They say that if the acts succeed
that they will not be done away with, but will be intensi-
fied."8 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. vs. Mahon, supra, the court
stated, "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to war-
rant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitu-
"Pennsylvania Coal Co. vs. Mahon. 43 Supreme Court Reporter 158.
UNation, October 18, 1933.
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tional way of paying for the change." If it is true that per-
manent changes are being made, nothing short of a constitu-
tional amendment should justify the change; otherwise the
Constitution would become a mere scrap of paper.
In wagering what decision the Supreme Court will hand
down it should be remembered that in the past the court has
always been very conservative and very prone to protect
vested property, rights; that the Child Labor Case and the
Rent Cases are five to four decisions; that the personnel of
the court is slightly changed from what it was; that it might
prove very unpopular for the court to declare the acts uncon-
stitutional; and that congress and the president could exercise
their power of packing the Supreme Court by adding new
justices as was done during the legal tender cases in the seven-
ties.14
There are other constitutional angles concerning said
acts which cannot be considered in this article (such as an
improper delegation of the powers of the legislature to the
executive department of the government). It is interesting to
note that in the only decision by a federal judge down to the
time of the writing of this article, the N. I. R. A. was held
unconstitutional. In that case Judge Alexander Akerman
refused to enjoin a St. Petersburg, Florida, cleaner who was
charging prices below those set by the N. R. A. code. In his
decision Judge Akerman said, "It would require a stretch of
imagination beyond the power of this court to concede that
a local industry engaged in the pressing, cleaning, and dyeing
of clothes was engaged in interstate commerce . . ." The
Constitution gave the national government no authority "to
invade the reserve power of the states in regulation of a local
industry even in an emergency."
1"Nation, October 18, 1933.
"The U. S. News, December 11, 1933, page 16.
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